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Abstract 
Future “on-demand” computing systems, often depicted as potentially large scale and com-
plex Service-Oriented Architectures, will need innovative management approaches for con-
trolling and matching services demand and supply. Centralized optimization approaches 
reach their bounds with increasing network size and number of nodes. The search for de-
centralized approaches has led to build on self-organization concepts like Autonomic Com-
puting, which draw their inspiration from Biology. This article shows how an alternative 
self-organization concept from Economics, the Catallaxy concept of F.A. von Hayek, can 
be realized for allocating service supply and demand in a distributed “on-demand” web 
services network. Its implementation using a network simulator allows evaluating the ap-
proach against a centralized resource broker, by dynamically varying connection reliability 
and node density in the network. Exhibiting Autonomic Computing properties, the Catal-
laxy realization outperforms a centralized broker in highly dynamic environments. 
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1. Introduction 
The focus of this article is on the presentation and evaluation of a self-organization mecha-
nism for allocating resources in a Grid-like Application Layer Network (ALN). ALNs are 
software architectures that allow the provisioning of services requiring larger amounts of 
resources, which can be obtained from computing systems connected over simple commu-
nication infrastructures such as the Internet. In general, Grid computing, Peer-to-Peer net-
works, On-Demand Computing and Service-oriented Architectures can be subsumed under 
this category. A particular resource allocation problem in these concepts is how to match 
the distributed demand for a service, with an existing, but unclear supply situation. 
Using self-organization for such computing system problems, instead of a centralized 
matchmaker, has recently gained attention by the start of large industrial research concepts 
like IBM’s Autonomic Computing or HP’s Adaptive Computing initiatives. The key motiva-
tion aspect for self-organization lies in the increasing size and complexity of today’s infor-
mation systems, which has led to a non-negligible growth of their control costs. Autonomic 
Computing uses a biological paradigm as a design and control metaphor, the autonomic 
nervous system {Kephart #111}. The core properties of the Autonomic Computing concept, 
the CHOP circle of self-configuring, self-healing, self-organization and self-protection is an 
electronic realization of the respective mechanisms of the human body.  
Abundant biological paradigms distract from the existence of self-organizing resource allo-
cation mechanisms elsewhere, which could, and have been used for engineering and con-
trolling computer systems. In the physical world,  for example, the proven ability of a free-
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market economy to adjudicate and satisfy the conflicting needs of millions of human agents 
recommends it as a decentralized organizational principle {Eymann, 2004 #95; Kephart 
#1094; Wellman #1715}.  
Applying Economic concepts to allocating or scheduling resources in computing systems is 
not a new idea (see {Huberman, 1988 #1012; Clearwater #625} for overviews). An early 
attempt at using economic ideas have been Agoric Open Systems (AOS) {Lavoie #118; 
Miller #1241}. AOS were defined as software systems that use market mechanisms for 
resource allocation, and encapsulate information, access paths and resources in objects 
traded by economic actor processes. Similar projects have been Mariposa {Stonebraker 
#1807}, Popcorn {Regev #1808}, and Spawn {Waldspurger #1809}. 
The basic problem can be characterized by having a number of processors, supplying com-
puting power to a demand situation composed of computation jobs. The particular question 
is how supply and demand can be matched to each other, if the actual situation on both 
sides is unclear. In closed environments, e.g. parallel computing, this question usually can 
be assumed away, as the number of processors is fixed and the arrival of computational 
jobs is deterministic.  
However, the advent of large, open distributed networks of processors, like in Grid comput-
ing, has spurred new interest in this question. Generalizing, to match a particular computa-
tion request to a processor service in a Grid, four phases have to be conducted: service dis-
covery, matching requests to services, scheduling the matched services and finally execu-
tion {Krauter, 2001 #1}. Existing sophisticated approaches for service discovery have been 
realized using flooding algorithms or distributed hash tables (DHT) {Ratnasamy, 2001 
#129; Balakrishnan, 2003 #2}. The result of the service discovery phase is a list of candi-
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date service provider instances. In this article, we assume that more than one service can 
provide access rights, and more than one client demands access - otherwise, the matching 
phase would be trivial. 
In the matching phase, either the client (decentralized case) or a resource broker (central-
ized case) have to select a match out of several possible pairings, which satisfies both par-
ties. A typical implementation of service selection, out of a list of discovered candidates, is 
a centralized matchmaker or resource broker {Chandra #601; Foster #827; Rabinovich 
#1406}. The matchmaker instance selects the apparently optimal match from the list, and 
the requesting client receives only the resulting name. Clients and service providers update 
the centralized resource broker in a continuous frequency about their requests and effective 
availability. Satisfaction can be ideally measured either by technical parameters (fast execu-
tion time, low bandwidth usage, minimal communication overhead) or by translating these 
to economic metrics, e.g. utility as minimal direct access costs or as a function of waiting 
time saved. In principle, existing service matching mechanisms can thus be visualized as a 
2x2 matrix shown in Figure 1.  
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Figure 1: A portfolio of Grid Service matching mechanisms  
Condor-G {Frey, 2002 #303}, Darwin {Chandra, 2001 #601}, and most Globus-based im-
plementations {Foster, 1999 #827} typically use a centralized matchmaker instance to 
evaluate the candidate list. The requesting client receives one matching partner, resulting 
from global optimization on latency, distance or bandwidth usage, according to the current 
network state. Extended central approaches implement auctioneers, like in EcoGrid or Nim-
rod/G {Buyya, 2002 #292; Buyya, 2002 #1813}, or electronic marketplace instances {Go-
moluch, 2003 #1814}, which collect bids and offers from the Grid nodes, and match supply 
and demand like a stock market mechanism does. Decentralized mechanisms, like in most 
file sharing networks, e.g. Gnutella {Adar, 2000 #383} or Kazaa, have no central point to 
collect supply and demand before matching. Each client decides for himself which service 
provider to match to based on technical parameters like estimated download time. The up-
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per right corner of Figure 1, requiring client-based economic decision-making mechanisms 
with a model-based prediction of the system state {Gomoluch, 2003 #1814} and allocation 
via bargaining models {Buyya, 2002 #1813}, is only sparsely populated (one failed attempt 
has been MojoNation {Mojo Nation, 2003 #121}. 
In the next two sections, we present an implementation of such a decentralized market 
mechanism concept, Hayek’s Catallaxy, using a multiagent system. A comparative simula-
tion of a Catallaxy resource allocation approach vs. a centralized approach in an application 
layer network indicates the strengths and weaknesses of the implementation. After that, we 
discuss related work on using Economic concepts for controlling computer systems, after 
which the article ends with the issue, whether the Catallaxy concept may be a fruitful alter-
native for engineering Autonomic Computing systems. 
3. The Catallaxy: a self-organization concept from Eco-
nomics 
Friedrich August von Hayek {Hayek #952} understood the market as a decentralized coor-
dination mechanism, as opposed to a centralized command economy. Apart from political 
macroeconomic thoughts, his work also provides concrete insight on the working mecha-
nisms of economic coordination. The emergence of software agent technology and increas-
ing size of information systems leads to the possibility of implementing Hayek’s Catallaxy 
concept and using the ensuing “spontaneous order” as a concrete proposal for both the de-
sign and coordination of information systems. However, a formal description of this self-
organizing market mechanism does not so far exist.  
The Catallaxy concept bases on the explicit assumption of self-interested actions of the 
participants, who try to maximize their own utility and choose their actions under incom-
plete information and bounded rationality {Simon #1539}. The term Catallaxy comes from 
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the Greek word “katallatein”, which means, “to barter” and at the same time, “to join a 
community.” The goal of Catallaxy is to arrive at a state of coordinated actions, the “spon-
taneous order”, which comes into existence through the bartering and communicating of the 
Community members with each other and thus, achieving a community goal that no single 
user has planned for {Hayek, 1989 #952}. The main characteristics of the Catallaxy 
{Hoppmann #1006} are that  
1. Participants work in their own interest to gain income. Every system element is a 
utility maximizing entity, which requires the definition of utility itself, of means to 
measure and compare income and utility, and to express a desire to reach a defined 
goal. For humans, these definitions have not necessarily to be explicit or thoroughly 
defined; for information system elements, this explicitness is required. 
2. Participants subjectively weigh and choose preferred alternatives in order to reach 
an income or utility maximization goal. In economic theory, the “homo 
oeconomicus” is a completely rational utility maximizer. He can choose an alterna-
tive action out of total knowledge about the environment. Hayek’s claim was that 
such an “objective” choice is not possible because of "constitutional ignorance”, 
that it is (inevitably) impossible to know each and every detail of the environment 
state. For large and very dynamic information systems, this is inherently true, and 
overcoming it by central means requires synchronization and restriction of possible 
actions of the single elements. 
3. Participants communicate using commonly accessible markets, where they barter 
about access to resources held by other participants. The development of prices for a 
specific good, whether they are increasing or decreasing, leads buyers to look for al-
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ternative sources of procurement and thus enhances the dynamics of the market. 
Note that a market here is nothing more than a communication bus – it is not a cen-
tral entity of its own, which collects all information and matches market participants 
using some optimization mechanisms, which would contradict “constitutional igno-
rance”. 
In human economic systems, these institutions are implicit; for a realization in distributed 
information systems, the properties of utility maximization, strategies and the exchange of 
offers need to be explicitly specified and implemented. Formal descriptions for using eco-
nomic mechanisms in distributed computing systems can be found in {Ferguson, 1996 
#796}. 
As a blueprint for other possible forms of Service Grids {Gomoluch, 2003 #1814} or Ap-
plication Layer Networks, we describe the concept using a simple web services scenario of 
a PDF conversion service {Catnet Project #85}{T-Online AG #137}: 
Adobe’s PDF file format is a common exchange file type for mixed text and graphics 
documents, mostly due to its preservation of layout specifics. The files are created using the 
(usually locally installed) Acrobat Distiller service, which converts from e.g. Microsoft 
Word or Postscript files. In an “on-demand” Service Grid, Distiller web services are 
available in the network, hosted by independent vendors and directly accessible from the 
software application, competing with each other for the clients’ demand. The word-
processor client programs transparently address such a networked PDF conversion service 
instance in the background, without disturbing the user’s course of work. Clients and ser-
vice provider instances bargain on access prices on a case-by-case basis, taking into ac-
count the current and prospective development of supply and demand to increase the mone-
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tary utility of their respective owners. Services instances are situated on host computers, 
which, for simplicity, are assumed to provide processor power and storage on a fixed cost 
basis. 
Economic actors are straightforwardly implemented as intelligent software agents 
{Wooldridge #1759}. Agents are embedded in an environment; whose state they experi-
ence through sensors; which lead to a comparison of an actual environment state with a 
desired environment state using an internal world model; and where they try to influence 
the environment state using effectors towards that more desirable state.  
Market Environment
Agent
Sensor: 
Price 
Signals
Effector: 
Ask/Bid Offers
Adaptation of 
Price Setting
Strategies
 
Figure 2: Properties of Digital Business Agents (cf. {Wooldridge #1759}) 
Figure 2 shows a Digital Business Agent {Eymann #301} working in a market environ-
ment. Sensors and effectors are realized as price signals incoming from and outgoing to the 
market environment. If the agents’ utility goals are not met by the present ownership situa-
tion, they negotiate with each other in order to maximize utility by exchanging resource 
access rights (e.g. using an alternating offers protocol {Rosenschein #1445}).  Bartering 
forms a sequence of effectors and sensors, this leads under partial and bounded knowledge 
to an adaptation of the agent’s internal model. Implementing Edgeworth bartering {Varian 
#1674}, the agents trade bilaterally and secretly with each other, if the internal world model 
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prognoses utility increase out of the potential transaction. Setting the price right is the most 
important action decision. Sellers intent to obtain the highest possible price for the service 
access they offer, buyers want to pay the lowest possible price for the service. To that re-
spect, the seller offers (Asks) will be higher than the reservation prices, while buyer offers 
(Bids) will probably be lower. A too high price in the face of competition will not lead to 
many transactions, while a price too low leads to less income per transaction. 
The constant price signaling between entities propagates changes in the scarcity of re-
sources throughout the system, and leads to constant adaptation of the system as a whole. 
Imperfect knowledge makes it thus necessary to adapt the agent’s price setting strategies 
dynamically in order to maximize individual utility. This is achievable using feedback 
learning algorithms (Evolutionary algorithms, Numerical optimization, or hybrid methods 
like Brenner’s VID model {Brenner #539}, which are all principally interchangeable 
{Müller #125}). 
In our example, three types of market agents appear (see Figure 3): the client agents, the 
service instance agents and the resource agents (as embodiments of the hardware/network 
provider). The market environment itself is not a solid object – it is a communication plat-
form, implicitly realized by the network provider, communicating the effector actions of all 
other agents in the environment. 
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Figure 3: Interaction relations in the Service Market 
 
• The Client is a computer program on a certain host, which needs access to a web ser-
vice to fulfil its design objectives. It tries to access that service at an arbitrary location 
within the computer network, use it for a defined period, and then continues with its 
own program sequence. Client programs run on a connected network resource, usually a 
personal computer. The business strategy of the client computes the fixed cost of pur-
chasing a local copy of Adobe Distiller against the variable cost of using such available 
On-Demand services, multiplying the forecast number of uses with the access price. If 
the client user does not need to convert to PDF so often, it will rely on a certain price 
and availability level of the service provider and refrain from buying an expensive local 
copy; if the usage frequency is above a certain number, it is in total cheaper to buy that 
exclusive copy. In an environment where services have to be paid for access, the utility 
gain of clients is the difference between their private value (of what the access is worth) 
and the actually paid transaction price: 
 ,Ci i pu v p= −  (1) 
• A Service is an instantiation of a general application function, embodied in a computer 
program. A Service Copy is an instance of the service; a resource computer, which pro-
vides both storage space and bandwidth for the access of the service, hosts it. The busi-
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ness model of the service provider leads to set the access price so that the majority of 
clients decide to rely on the on-demand option. In theory, the price will be equal to the 
marginal cost of processing the penultimate access, which means that it is exactly so 
high that the consumer is undecided whether to buy the local copy or access the remote 
service (provided that both prognoses the same number of accesses in a given time 
span). If the service provider is able to distribute several instances (service copies) in 
the network, he might be able to sell each copy access for a different price, according to 
the time of day, the geography of the network or the willingness of clients to pay. Each 
redundant web Service Copy is thus a miniature business, like a retailer’s branch store. 
Like the clients, the service providers also have a private value for service access (sa) . 
In addition, there is private value for buying network resource access (ra) from the 
hosting node: 
 ( ) ( ), ,SC sa sa ra raj p j p ju p v v p= − + −  (2) 
• A Resource denotes a host computer, which provides a limited number of storage space 
and access bandwidth for service transmission. The network connections between the 
resources are simulated to be of equal length and thus of equal transmission time and 
costs. The resources and network owner (the network provider) allows service providers 
and clients to communicate using cables, routers, gateways and other, hardware or 
software network layer instances. For the usage of these resources, he gains income 
from all participants – the more participants, the more money can the network provider 
make. However, more participants means more traffic in the network, and above some 
level the traffic can get so extensive that the existing resources are no longer sufficient. 
However, if the dimensioning of resources is too large, the income from the participants 
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might not be high enough that the resource investment is economically justified. In the 
long run, the network provider will provide enough network resources for the average 
use, but will be vulnerable to usage spikes. These resources incur costs, and the network 
provider aims to fill these costs and to make profits by increasing the usage of the re-
sources:  
 ,Rk p ku p v= −  (3) 
Summing up all utility functions over the number of respective participants, the parameter 
Social welfare utility (SWF) measures how the aggregate of all the individual utility is 
maximized. The equation thus can be written as 
 C SC RSWF i j kU u u u= + +∑ ∑ ∑  (4) 
After each successful trade, the sum of all utilities of all participants increases. A fictive 
final state would have maximum overall utility and is Pareto-optimal, which means that no 
single agent can propose a change that does not decrease any other’s utility. However, as 
ALN nodes appear and disappear dynamically, such a solid state may never be reached. 
Under the restriction of an imperfect knowledge situation, a total optimal value of SWF can 
only be measured in hindsight. 
5. Simulation of a Catallactic application layer network 
In this section, we compare two methods of allocating resources using a network simula-
tion, while varying the number of active network nodes and the dynamics of their connec-
tion to the network. The purpose is to evaluate how a centralized resource allocation 
method, which depends on total knowledge, performs in comparison to a decentralized re-
source allocation method working on imperfect knowledge, in large and highly dynamic 
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environments {Catnet Project #85}. Our CATNET ALN simulator allows comparing two 
main resource allocation strategies: a “baseline” control mechanism and a “Catallactic” 
control mechanism.  
The baseline control mechanism computes the resource allocation decision employing a 
centralized resource broker instance, using a sealed-bid double auction in continuous time 
intervals. Location and interfaces of the dedicated service coordinator (the master service 
copy, MSC) are known to the individual service copies (SC). Whenever a client broadcasts 
a request in the network via the connected resource hosts, the MSC gets the request for-
warded. Out of its knowledge of network status, the MSC is able to compute the costs of 
providing a service, ranks those virtual offers of all SCs, and sends back an accept message 
revealing the cheapest SC to the client. Settling the payment for the service invocation 
would be a matter of the individual SC and the client in an “on-demand” economy. 
In the Catallactic mechanism, no MSC exists. The clients broadcast their requests over the 
network in a Gnutella-like fashion, trying to reach as much service copies as possible, 
within the diameter of the message’s hop counter. Any available SC, which receives the 
request message, returns a propose message containing the initial price for provisioning the 
service. The client orders all incoming proposals in its inbox and, beginning with the best 
offer, engages in a bilateral alternating offers protocol until acceptance or final rejection, in 
which cases he continues further down the ranked list of offers. 
The key ingredient to achieving Catallaxy lays in the computation of the initial offer prices 
of the seller and buyer agents. As reception of all requests cannot be guaranteed, the SC 
agents have only partial knowledge of the market status. They thus can not exactly compute 
the true supply function. A self-interested strategy tries to estimate the supply function, 
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adds some slack for uncertainty, and some percentage for one’s own utility maximization. 
Inevitably, the actual demand and supply curves will lead to a small, inevitable market effi-
ciency loss.  
However, the feedback from the market leads to continuous adaptation. The effect of issu-
ing some offer into the market is followed by sensing, whether that offer has lead to a suc-
cessful transaction or not (cf. Figure 2). If the offer of the SC is turned down, the price may 
have been too high – the adaptation of the negotiation strategy leads to relaxing the initial 
price. On the other hand, if the SC’s offer is successful, the initial price can be raised to 
gain more income from the transaction. The agent’s strategy thus follows the dynamics of 
supply and demand, as indicated in the following example: 
In the PDF example, the Catallactic mechanism works by giving the requesting client an 
argument for selecting one conversion service over the other. Given conversion service 
instances A (demanding an access fee of € 0.12) and B (demanding € 0.14) and all other 
parameters being equal (such as communication cost, processing time etc.), client C with a 
subjective market price of € 0.13 would naturally select instance A. Both A and C realize a 
utility increase of € 0.01. The economic interplay of supply and demand, implemented as an 
adaptation procedure in the agent’s strategies, now leads to emergent coordination: the 
self-interested service instance A tries to raise the access fee to € 0.13, because it was suc-
cessful, while instance B lowers its price to € 0.13 for just the opposite reason. The self-
interested client instance C adapts its subjective market price to € 0.12, preventing a steady 
raise of the provider prices. In future negotiations and with thousands of similar proce-
dures in parallel, the market price will accordingly settle at a steady level, providing emer-
gent and stable coordination to the network as a whole. 
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In our simulations, we have analyzed changing ALN environments by varying the network 
setup using the dimensions of node density and node dynamics. Node density measures the 
number of service copies available in the network – the more SCs can provide service ac-
cess, the denser is the network. Node dynamics measures the probability that SCs can be-
come disconnected and reconnected again – a static network shows a constant availability 
of 100%, while a peer-to-peer network is practically defined by continuous appearance and 
disappearance of nodes. The intention of choosing these dimensions was to capture differ-
ent types of ALN environments in one simulation, while restricting the number of simula-
tions that need to be run. In the current model, for each change in the underlying variables, 
we have run 50 simulations: 25 for Catallactic and 25 for Baseline resource allocation. As 
simulation input we use a trace of client demands containing service requests. Each service 
request specifies the amount of service, a price, and the duration of the invocation. All 
simulations use the same demand trace.  
 17
Position of Master 
Service Copy
„Backbone“
Outer leaves
Inner node ring
 
Figure 4: Network topology 
The physical network topology used in the simulations is organized in two rings, each hav-
ing three levels of pentagons with leaves on the outer level (Figure 4). The rings are con-
nected at the inner pentagon nodes; the intention of that topology is to resemble current 
ALNs, which mainly consist of two networks in North America and Europe, connected by a 
few backbones. The ALN is built on top of the physical network. Network nodes are instan-
tiated having one of the previously described types, being a client, service copy or resource 
agent. Depending on the particular simulation, a node may contain several agents or no 
agent at all. In the second case, the node acts as a router. Table 1 shows the configuration of 
the simulations. 
Table 1: Description of the Simulations 
Input trace - 2000 service requests generated randomly by 150 clients over a time interval of 100 s. - time between issuing requests is 75 ms. 
 18
- each request is for 1 service unit.  
- each request message can travel 10 hops distance maximum. 
- each service invocation has a duration of 5s, in which the SC is blocked. 
- Cycle time of the master service copy, if active, is 150ms. 
Topology - 212 physical nodes in 2 rings. 
Node  
density 
Always 150 clients on the leaves of one physical network ring. 
Different density applies to resource and service copy agents. 
- Density 0:   6 nodes hold 50 service copies each. 
- Density 1: 12 nodes hold 25 service copies each. 
- Density 2: 25 nodes hold 12 service copies each. 
- Density 3: 50 nodes hold   6 service copies each. 
- Density 4: 75 nodes hold   4 service copies each. 
 
Node  
dynamics 
Dynamic behavior: On start, 70% of the service copies are connected. 
- Dynamics 0 : Service copies do not change their state (static network) 
- Dynamics 1: Every 200 ms any service copy can change its state (con-
nected/disconnected) with a probability of 0.2. 
- Dynamics 2: as before with a probability of 0.4 
- Dynamics 3: as before with a probability of 0.6 
- Dynamics 4: as before with a probability of 0.8 
The following results are from the same simulation. The first question is how the system 
behaves with respect to the Resource Allocation Efficiency (RAE), which measures the 
percentage of successful negotiations. In an Edgeworth barter setting, every successful ne-
gotiation indicates an increase in overall utility. The metric thus allows a statement on the 
overall performance of the system. The total values of the scale are artifacts of the simula-
tion setup, but the relative performance of Catallaxy vs. Baseline is repeatable.  
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Figure 5: Resource Allocation Efficiency for Catallactic vs. Baseline Simulations 
The left side of Figure 5 shows the results of the decentralized, Catallactic resource alloca-
tion approach. The two axes at the bottom reference to the changes in node density and 
network dynamics, as explained in Table 1. The RAE performance decreases with increas-
ing dynamics, the worst RAE occurs when density is low (only few nodes exist) and dy-
namics are high. In comparison with the Baseline approach shown on the right side, the 
slow decrease in overall performance is notable. For a static network with low dynamics 
and low density, both mechanisms fare quite well, as there is ample time to discover all 
available services, negotiate with them and decide on allocation. Changes in the density of 
the resources have only small effect on the Baseline RAE. As the central Baseline broker 
does the main work, the geographical layout of the network seems to play only a minor 
role. With increasing dynamics, however, the Catallactic RAE is less affected. 
 20
If we look closer at technical parameters, which are known to be inferior for distributed 
systems and bargaining approaches, we find a different picture. An example is the response 
time (REST), which marks the time span between issuing a demand request and the final 
satisfaction or rejection of that request (timed-out negotiation attempts in-between add up 
to the total). Figure 6 shows average response times for the successful and accepted service 
negotiations, with the Catallactic approach to the left. When comparing Catallaxy here to 
Figure 5, the outcome is quite diverse: Except for high dynamics in a low density regime, 
the outcome seems to be relatively stable. A REST of approx. 600ms is the maximum, 
which is probable an artefact of the flooding algorithm, searching to get an adequate num-
ber of replies. At higher density levels, and seemingly independent of the dynamics level, 
we find a minimum below 320ms. The decentralized approach would probably benefit from 
using a revised discovery algorithm like CAN or Chord in low density and dynamics re-
gimes.   
The right side of Figure 6 shows the response time of the Baseline mechanism, resulting in 
a rugged landscape. The outcome is determined by the cycle time of the master service 
copy (MSC), which synchronizes the existing market situation and concentrates it at one 
location. Dynamics thus has an ample impact on the response time, with a twofold increase 
over the simulation range. This is probably caused by higher dynamics leading to more 
misallocations and therefore to time-consuming new requests and allocations. Density 
variations have only a slight effect on the response time, because the geographical distances 
in the network are equalized by the MSC.  
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Figure 6: Response Time for Catallactic vs. Baseline Simulations 
 
6. On implementing Economic Self-Organization in Com-
puting Environments 
What makes Economics so attractive for computing environments is that its central research 
question lies in the effective allocation of resources, provided by suppliers and in demand 
by customers. In computing environments like Grid Computing, the resources in question 
are processor time or storage space, while the economic actors are computers or web ser-
vices {Buyya #574; Buyya #292}. It appears that, by just implementing markets in comput-
ing environments, the satisfying ability of economics might be viable for creating cost-
effective computer architectures. 
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However, between the mostly descriptive economic concept and the normative technical 
implementation lies a fundamental gap, requiring selective choice of how actors, resources, 
goods, and markets are modelled and embedded in a technical environment. Some re-
searchers call this task “market engineering” {Weinhardt #144}. The basic purpose of mar-
ket engineering is to capture the inherently decentralized, dynamic coordination nature of 
the economic concept, and to translate that into a technical realization, which allows opti-
mizing resource allocation. 
The „market“ as a decentralized, 
dynamic coordination mechanism
Economic Concept
Technical
Implementation
Service-Oriented Architectures
?
 
Figure 7: Realizing economic concepts in a technical implementation 
There are several competing descriptive approaches to how economic resource allocation 
mechanisms work. In general, Economics is essentially all about the coordination of sys-
tems consisting of utility-maximizing agents, who satisfy their needs using some mecha-
nism for solving a distributed resource allocation problem. The effect of this mechanism is a 
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state where prices are set, so that supply and demand is perfectly balanced, and the number 
of transactions is maximized {Kearney #1088}. All implementation attempts try either to 
recreate the mechanism, or to achieve the effect by using another mechanism, adding some 
side condition like zero communication costs or a steady environment state. 
Adam Smith’s proverbial invisible hand {Smith #1551} was a first concept of a decentral-
ised mechanism without a co-ordinator, but Smith gave no implementation of that mecha-
nism. A century later, Leon Walras {Walras #1690} introduced a central auctioneer, who 
iteratively solved the allocation problem out of total knowledge of supply and demand. 
With this mechanism, Walras was able to generate the desired equilibrium effect.  
Most of today’s economic research relies on Walras’ tatônnement process as a valid picture 
of the mechanism, which influences also the possible realization in computing environ-
ments. An example is the realization by Wellman {Wellman #1715}, titled Market-
Oriented Programming (MOP), in an distributed artificial intelligence (DAI) environment. 
Wellman takes the notion that „an economy is a multiagent system” literally; the distributed 
agents individually compute their utility functions and post that information to a centralized 
Walrasian auctioneer. During the computation process, interrelated markets are succes-
sively brought to near-equilibrium by the auctioneer, with the final general equilibrium 
effect as the „gold standard” to achieve. MOP has been successfully used in electricity 
markets {Ygge #1771}, for multi-commodity flow problems {Wellman #1714}, supply 
chain management {Wellman #145} or for negotiations about the quality of service in mul-
timedia networks {Yamaki #1768}.  
In contrast, Economics research on self-organization still aims at explaining the mechanism 
of the invisible hand, e.g. Agent-based Computational Economics {Tesfatsion #1611}. Ac-
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tually, there is growing interest in using self-organization, as indicated by the start of large 
industrial research concepts like IBM’s Autonomic Computing initiative. Autonomic Com-
puting uses a biological paradigm as a design and control metaphor, the autonomic nervous 
system {Kephart #111}. If the mechanisms underlying Hayek’s spontaneous order concept 
{Hayek #952} can be properly understood, it might be possible to build large Autonomic 
information systems using the Catallaxy approach, where artificial entities coordinate them-
selves, just as human economy participants do in the real world. For a start, we have to dis-
cuss whether the desired effects of Autonomic Computing are achievable (and describable) 
using economic terms. 
IBM’s Autonomic Computing Manifesto {IBM #312} describes seven characteristics, 
which self-adapting systems should exhibit. The core characteristics are contained in the 
so-called CHOP cycle of self-configuring, self-healing, self-optimizing and self-protection 
capabilities. The self-configuration property is indicated in the variation of prices when 
adding or removing service providers (cf. the different density regimes). The self-healing of 
the system is apparent in case a service provider instance shuts down or a network connec-
tion gets broken (cf. the different dynamics regimes). The application is self-optimizing, in 
that the agents constantly attempt to change their strategies towards the maximum utility-
eliciting negotiation positions, which respectively lay on the total supply and demand 
curves. The self-protection of the application finally can be reached by including security 
mechanisms like reputation tracking {Eymann #300}, which are effective in separating 
malicious and underperforming agents. 
In addition, viewing Autonomic Computing systems as Economic systems has some merits, 
too. The main applications for AC systems will be deeply rooted in a business context. 
With a biological background, you need to find biological translations for conceptual data 
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structures and functionality for describing success, utility, or business goals. This is not a 
trivial process, and may lead to semantic loss underway. For example, the business goal of 
maintaining availability (to prevent loss of profit in the case of server downtime), may be 
translated biologically as “staying alive”. However, the semantics of both differ – deliber-
ately shutting down a biological AC system may qualify for murder, while in economic 
terms, shutting down a system means buying it out of business – with the programmer de-
fining what the currency is. 
7. Conclusion 
The CATNET simulation presented in this article is a generalizable network simulation for 
application layer networks. We have used its specification and the properties of the re-
source allocation mechanism to investigate into constructing Autonomic Computing sys-
tems using an Economics, rather than a Biology approach. Our simulation results indicate 
that resource allocation in networks, where many small nodes work in a highly dynamic 
environment, can be coordinated successfully by the Catallaxy paradigm. The results pre-
sented in this article are only the first step towards successfully engineering “economic” 
autonomic computing systems (see also {Cheliotis #1810}). On the engineering side, we 
found optimization potential in the design of the negotiation protocol or in the possibility to 
relocate underperforming service copy instances to other hosts. 
The key to this semantic shift is to view the „market“ as an emergent mechanism of coordi-
nating and matching supply and demand offers, and market participants as rationally-
bounded, self-interested individuals, like in Neo-Austrian {Hayek #952} or Neo-
Institutional Economics {North #1308}{Furubotn #1811}. As we move on to technology, 
which allows us to map unstructured semantic knowledge in large and very dynamic sys-
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tems, we have to look for decentralized self-organization, not at least for reasons of expo-
nentially increasing „costs of ownership” {Truex #1639}. 
Given a highly complex and dynamic ALN infrastructure, scalability and the management 
of a great number of heterogeneous resources are supposed to be challenging issues of fu-
ture ALNs and computing systems in general. Ubiquitous computing {Weiser #1712} envi-
sions trillions of computing devices connecting and interacting with each other; Grid Com-
puting {Snelling #131} envisions millions of networked processors. To handle the com-
plexity and scale of such systems, the necessity of a centralized management could easily 
turn the vision into a “nightmare” {Kephart #111}. The solution is not necessarily a ques-
tion of overcoming semantic gaps or problems of multi-attribute optimization. Discovering 
and selecting web services from huge numbers of unreliable candidates alone is challenging 
enough. 
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